How Are Authoritarian Models Marketed in Egyptian Discourse?
In recent years, a new tone has begun to creep into official and media discourse in Egypt: that Western democracy “does not suit us,” and that there are “alternative models” more compatible with our cultural and developmental specificities. At the forefront of these models is the “Chinese model,” promoted as a disciplined or “participatory democracy” that works for development and stability.
But behind this promotion lies a fundamental question: Is what is being marketed as an “alternative model” truly a democracy? Or is it merely an attempt to justify authoritarianism with an intellectual template imported from the East?
The Egyptian state does not officially fully adopt the Chinese model, but it points to it as an example of:
Development without political turmoil
Long-term rule by a “strong and rational” leadership
Reducing the role of the opposition to protect “stability.”
This is evident in:
Official speeches about “democracy that suits our specificities”
Opinion articles discussing the “failure of the Western model”
The media focus is on China’s achievements, without mentioning repression or the lack of pluralism.
The media discourse shifts from “privacy” to “developmental democracy,” with increasing use of terms such as:
We need a developmental democracy, not anarchy
The West imposes its standards on us, while it itself is failing
The people want development, not ballot boxes
This discourse recycles Chinese and Russian arguments, but it is presented in local language that justifies existing repression, not as a call to adopt a new, effective model.
One of the most important examples of the similarity of Egyptian and Eastern discourse is
First, regarding the priority of “stability” over “freedom.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s statement:
“Development cannot be achieved without stability. If the country is plunged into chaos, how can we talk about human rights?”
In Egypt, a discourse is repeated that links the 2011 revolutions to chaos and blames excessive freedoms for the collapse. Example: Statement by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (October 2021):
“We want freedom? Well, the revolution brought freedom. Look what happened to us… The country was almost lost.”
Second, statements related to the focus on economic development as an alternative legitimacy.
Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“Human rights begin with the right to life and development. Democracy is not a one-size-fits-all solution.
Egypt: National projects and infrastructure are presented as evidence of the regime’s success and an alternative to demands for political rights.
Statement by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (2020):
“Human rights are not just freedom of expression… Human rights mean health, education, work, and decent housing. He continued, “I don’t know how to teach, I don’t know how to treat, and they talk to me about human rights.”
Also, identical statements related to hostility to so-called “foreign interference.”
Statement by President Xi Jinping (2021):
“We will not allow any foreign power to theorize about democracy and human rights.”
President Sisi’s statement (2022):
“We will not allow anyone to interfere in our affairs… We are a sovereign state and we know what is in our country’s best interest.”
In addition to identical statements demonizing civil society organizations and linking them to chaos
Statement by a Chinese official (2020):
“Foreign-funded organizations may be used as a tool for destabilization.”
President Sisi’s statement (2018):
“Not everyone who works in civil society is a patriot… There are some who work against their country in the name of rights.”
Finally, Egyptian media and political discourse converge with discourses that can be described as (Eastern or Eastern Bloc discourses, led by China and Russia) in the use of terms such as “disciplined democracy” or “cultural specificity.”
Official statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (2022):
“Democracy is not the property of the West… We have our own democracy that suits our culture.”
President Sisi’s statement (2016):
“We can’t take Europe’s experiences and apply them here… We have our own circumstances and history.”
The question now is, is the Chinese model truly democratic?
From a Western and liberal perspective, the Chinese model is not considered a democracy at all:
There are no real elections.
A single party dominates the state and society.
There is no freedom of expression or independent press.
Censorship and spying are part of daily life.
However, the Chinese Communist Party markets its model as a “disciplined democracy” based on non-electoral representation and “participation through formal organizations.”
This concept resonates with authoritarian states seeking to improve their image before their people and the world.
Why is this model being promoted in Egypt now?
It is a model that can be exploited
as a justification for a security clampdown: confronting crises requires “firmness,” and democracy is portrayed as a burden.
As a competitor to the West: In light of Egypt’s confrontation with Western criticism, the Chinese model appears a “comfortable” alternative.
As a verbal trick:
flirting with the word “democracy” to empty it of its true meaning.
This is dangerous in emptying democracy of its meaning.
When “democracy” becomes merely development without rights, or participation without pluralism, we are not establishing an alternative system, but rather legitimizing tyranny, while cloaking it in modern language.
If citizens lose confidence that democracy means rights and participation, this leads to the normalization of oppression as a permanent fate.
I see no alternative but a genuine local democracy, not a fake one.
What Egypt needs is neither a Western clone nor an imitation of China, but rather:
A democratic model that takes into account local realities without abandoning fundamental rights.
A genuine political participation that guarantees accountability and opens the door to criticism and pluralism.
A development based on transparency, not enforced silence.
In concluding my remarks today, I believe it is necessary to emphasize that “Chinese-style democracy” may seem attractive to some authoritarian elites, but it is not a real solution for peoples seeking dignity and justice. What is required is a redefinition of democracy from within the Egyptian experience, not a replacement of local oppression with authoritarian rhetoric imported from the East. Development is not a substitute for rights, as there can be no true development without guaranteeing human rights.
Human. Development that comes at the expense of dignity and freedoms is nothing but empty cement and steel projects, upon which a strong state cannot be built.
No trade-off: Security cannot replace freedom, nor can bread replace dignity.
The moral and political reductionism that says “either security or freedom,” or “either development or democracy,” is a manipulation of consciousness unbecoming of a self-respecting state.
The path to a just future does not pass through importing authoritarian versions from abroad, but rather through formulating a true Egyptian model that respects rights and freedoms and believes that citizens are partners, not subordinates. Human rights are not an elitist luxury, but rather a necessary condition for building a just and stable state.
